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The Political Economy of
Decarbonization
A RESEARCH AGENDA
Eric Biber,† Nina Kelsey†† & Jonas Meckling*
INTRODUCTION
Even nonextreme outcomes from global warming will
cause a variety of effects on human and global ecosystems.
These include rises in sea level that impact major cities and
densely populated delta areas, heat waves that kill thousands
of people, changes in precipitation and temperature that reduce
agricultural yields, shifts in species ranges and numbers that
destabilize ecosystems around the world, acidification of the
ocean that destroys coral reefs and plankton species that are
the foundation for marine food chains, and more.
But to avoid catastrophic climate change, humanity is
faced with the daunting problem of fundamentally changing
the processes by which it obtains and uses the energy needed to
sustain a modern industrial society. Society must shift from an
economic system built on carbon-based fossil fuels and the
industries associated with them toward an economic system
based on alternative sources of energy like biofuels,
hydropower, solar, wind, and perhaps nuclear. Such a shift
entails major transformations in areas ranging from industry
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processes and business models, to major public and private
infrastructure, to urban planning and behavior.
Moreover, society has to accomplish this shift soon.
Scientists have indicated that the failure to make substantial,
rapid shifts in energy sources in the near- and medium-term
could lead to major impacts on global climates and oceans.1
Politicians too have recognized the need to implement major
changes in energy sources, as evidenced by the 2015 agreement in
Paris of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change. These agreements call for
holding average global warming to below 2°C above preindustrial
levels, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.2
Yet for almost every country on the planet, there are
large gaps between what scientists and politicians agree society
must undertake to be successful in managing an energy
transition away from fossil fuels, and what current laws and
policies provide for. For instance, the United States’ Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) under the Paris
Agreement is a reduction of 26%–28% below 2005 levels of
greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2025.3 However, this level
of emissions reduction commitment is modest and insufficient;
much greater levels of reduction by the United States and others
are required. A United Nations analysis of the sum of INDCs
submitted prior to the Paris conference (as of October 2015)
suggested that there is a substantial gap between the aggregate
emissions reductions contained in the INDCs and the emissions
reductions required to meet the 2- or 1.5-degree goal;4 UN
officials concluded that the current INDCs would lead to a
2.7°C rise in average temperature.5 An analysis by Climate
Action Tracker based on INDCs submitted as of December 7,
1 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6–26 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UUU-R8QH].
2 Paris Agreement art. 2.1(a), Dec. 12, 2015, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8VTVD3F].
3 U.S.A., U.S. COVER NOTE INDC AND ACCOMPANYING INFORMATION (2015),
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States
%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20I
nformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/53ZC-743X].
4 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Synthesis
Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, 8,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/7 (Oct. 30, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/
eng/07.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V8U-U22K].
5 Fiona Harvey, World’s Climate Pledges Not Yet Enough to Avoid Dangerous
Warming—UN, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2015/oct/30/worlds-climate-pledges-likely-to-lead-to-less-than-3c-of-warming-un [https://
perma.cc/GEP5-HNC8].
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2015, found a similar temperature outcome overall6 and noted
that the United States’ pledge specifically represented a level of
ambition that would not hold temperature increases below 2°C if
all countries pursued a similar level.7 And these analyses assume
the INDCs are all met; the INDCs are not legally binding.
This gap reflects the reality of immense political
resistance to the necessary energy transformation. Society has
adapted to the use of fossil fuels: businesses profit from their
production and use; citizens are employed in their extraction
and processing; and many industries currently rely on the power
they supply. The global energy economy is locked into fossil fuel
production and consumption.8 Although polling suggests that
people are actually relatively positive toward low-carbon energy
sources like wind and solar in the abstract,9 in practice, both
industry actors and voters have proven skeptical about broad,
transformative clean energy policies.10
Climate policy has distributional effects: it imposes
costs on some and provides benefits to others. In the current
energy system, powerful incumbent players are predominantly
exposed to the (potential) cost of climate policy.11 It is, thus,
easy to assemble political coalitions that make strong or
comprehensive policy difficult. Most policies that have been
implemented are therefore incremental and limited at best—
such as very weak carbon taxes; cap and trade systems that
cover only subsets of economies or have very generous caps; or
limited (in either time or total funding) subsidies for renewable
installations.12 And in many jurisdictions, even weak,
6 Effect of Current Pledges and Policies on Global Temperature, CLIMATE
ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/global.html [https://perma.cc/V7YQFTEE] (last updated Nov. 1, 2016).
7 USA, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
usa.html [https://perma.cc/U7BK-TE7L] (last updated Nov. 2, 2016).
8 Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817,
817–18 (2000).
9 STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & DAVID M. KONISKY, CHEAP AND CLEAN: HOW
AMERICANS THINK ABOUT ENERGY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 48–57 (2014).
10 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for
Climate Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV.
399, 447–52 (2013) (describing failure of federal cap-and-trade legislation in the United
States in 2010 in part due to industry resistance).
11 DAVID CIPLET ET AL., POWER IN A WARMING WORLD: THE NEW GLOBAL
POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE REMAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITY
133–51 (2015).
12 For a general overview of a number of existing carbon-pricing schemes
including the EU ETS and the U.S. Northeast’s RGGI, see Joseph E. Aldy & Robert
Stavins, The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17569, 2011), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17569.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ENB-9XWM]. Another useful overview of the
current state of carbon pricing globally is WORLD BANK GRP., STATE AND TRENDS OF
CARBON PRICING 2016, at 14 fig.3 (2016), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit
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incremental policy has proven difficult to create—as seen, for
instance, in the failure of the U.S. Congress to pass even
modest climate change legislation.13
Thus, an essential question for the future is how to
bridge the gap between current energy policies and what is
necessary to move to a post-carbon future. But scholarship to
date has some substantial limitations that limit its ability to
produce useful answers to this question.
Much of the current energy law and policy literature has
focused on what kinds of policies are economically efficient within
existing technical constraints. For instance, a long debate has
proceeded in academic circles over whether a carbon tax or a capand-trade marketable permit system is the optimal policy choice.14
The debate has proceeded over which tool is more economically
efficient and which tool is more administratively feasible to
operate. Both these approaches—based on a shared concept of
carbon pricing that uses market mechanisms to curb carbon

stream/handle/10986/25160/9781464810015.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y [https://perma.
cc/PB38-Y2LZ]. As this report shows, globally, the majority of carbon-pricing schemes
are currently pricing carbon below $10 per ton of CO2 equivalents. Id. While there is
debate over the “right” cost of carbon, most analyses place it substantially higher. EPA
recently shifted to using $36/tCO2e, see Brad Plumer, An Obscure New Rule on Microwaves
Can Tell Us a Lot About Obama’s Climate Policies, WASH. POST (June 5, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/06/05/what-an-obscure-microwave-rule-saysabout-obamas-climate-plans/ [https://perma.cc/542Y-JUDE], but some analyses suggest it
could be much higher than that, see Frances C. Moore & Delavane B. Diaz, Temperature
Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 127, 127–31 (2015).
13 JONAS MECKLING, CARBON COALITIONS: BUSINESS, CLIMATE POLITICS, AND
THE RISE OF EMISSIONS TRADING 133–66 (2011); Janelle Knox-Hayes, Negotiating
Climate Legislation: Policy Path Dependence and Coalition Stabilization, 6 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 545, 550–54 (2012).
14 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap
and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8 (2009); Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax,
34 U.C. DAVIS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 69 (2010) (arguing that a carbon tax “presents the
best alignment of technology, capital, and policy to directly respond to the approaching
energy and environmental crisis”); Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How
to Overcome Politics and Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,118, 10,118
(2009) (arguing that a carbon tax is the best regulatory approach but that significant
impediments, namely the United States’ cultural aversion to taxes, must be overcome);
Roberta Mann, To Tax or Not to Tax Carbon—Is That the Question?, 24 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 44, 44 (2009) (asserting that implementation of a carbon tax and cap-and-trade
system will play an essential role in reducing carbon emissions); Robert R. Nordhaus &
Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 120–59 (2005) (evaluating four
approaches to regulation: upstream or downstream cap-and-trade, greenhouse gas tax,
product standards, and hybrid programs); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Capand-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 293–96,
305 (2008) (proposing an “upstream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system that
implements a gradual trajectory of emission reductions” over time).

2017]

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECARBONIZATION

609

emissions—are generally considered inherently superior to direct
interventions like regulations, mandates, and subsidies.15
Yet this debate omits the questions of which tools are
most politically feasible to implement over the near- to
medium-term. The potential economic efficiency of a policy is
irrelevant if it is politically infeasible. And in fact, the record to
date suggests that economically optimal tools based on carbon
pricing approaches are typically quite difficult politically,
particularly as “first steps” towards more ambitious policies.
Where one sees carbon pricing tools in general, they tend to be
weak; and they tend to follow after the creation of earlier direct
interventions like renewable portfolio standards or feed-in
tariffs.16 This suggests that understanding the political feasibility
and sequencing of potential policy choices—particularly how
political feasibility can change over time in the context of
sequenced choices—is important.
For instance, jurisdictions that are policy “success
stories” like California or Germany are passing mitigation
policies now that previously would not have been politically
feasible.17 This suggests that perhaps jurisdictions that currently
lack the political will for such a strong emissions reduction
policy could develop it. It is political actors operating within a
political context who ultimately make the decisions about which
energy policies countries will pursue. And a focus on what is
politically feasible right now is myopic. Although action now is
essential, it is also true that addressing climate change and a
shift to a post-carbon future is a long-term process. Moreover, we
can expect that over the course of this lengthy process, factors
such as interest configurations, coalitions, and political and
technical constraints will change—both in response to what

15 See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Richard G. Newell, Environmental and
Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 142, 142–44
(2008) (concluding that subsidies as a stand-alone tool are inefficient and costly);
Stephen H. Schneider & Lawrence H. Goulder, Achieving Low-Cost Emissions Targets,
389 NATURE 13, 13 (1997) (concluding that taxes are superior to subsidies in achieving
climate policy goals).
16 Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy: Green Industrial
Policy Builds Support for Carbon Regulation, 349 SCIENCE 1170, 1170–71 (2015).
17 Examples in California include Assemb. B. 32, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2006), S.B. 32, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), and Assemb. B. 197, 2015–
2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); and in Germany, the overall societal, economic, and
regulatory transformation referred to as “Energiewende,” including Germany’s significant
emissions reduction commitments to the EU and the “Energy Concept” created in 2010 by
the German BMWi (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy), FED. MINISTRY OF
ECON. & TECH., ENERGY CONCEPT FOR AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND, RELIABLE AND
AFFORDABLE ENERGY SUPPLY (2010), http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/energyconcept,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY5J-8F95].
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society does now and to ways that will shape what society can
do later.
Accordingly, addressing climate change requires
understanding how different kinds of policy or legal tools that
society enacts now might either enable or retard future efforts
to decarbonize our energy systems. We should not be asking
merely what kinds of policy tools are optimal or feasible right
now. We should be asking what kinds of tools can society use
now that are most likely to make future efforts to advance
decarbonization more feasible politically—and allow those
efforts to be stronger and more comprehensive than what we
can achieve today.
Our project—an ongoing effort based on the research
agenda we lay out here—is an effort to answer this question,
which we believe is central to the challenges of moving to a
post-carbon future. Answering this question requires
understanding how policy and legal tools shape interest groups
and their incentives to fight or support future policy and legal
steps to decarbonize societies. Accordingly, we consider our work
to be answering the question of how to understand the dynamics
of the political economy of decarbonization.18 Methodologically,
our work is comparative across economic sectors and across
jurisdictions. In regard to economic sectors, we are particularly
interested in how the transformation of energy systems might
differ between the power and transport sectors. Starting with
individual sectors and jurisdictions allows for a bottom-up
strategy to building theory about decarbonization.
Part I of this article defines the parameters of the
research agenda and outlines our existing research as a starting
point for it. Part II lays out the specifics of the research agenda
itself and describes many of the key questions that we believe
will need to be answered to advance understanding of the
political economy of decarbonization. Part III discusses two
extensions of our research agenda into additional areas,
specifically the development of social norms and the possibility
that political economy dynamics may “lock-in” suboptimal
climate policies.
18 We recognize that there will be other important policy steps to resolve as part
of addressing the challenges of climate change, above and beyond decarbonizing our energy
sources. For instance, increasing energy efficiency for existing uses and reducing the
demand for energy will also be essential. The political economy approach we outline for
decarbonization would be equally applicable to these policy areas, although we also believe
there may well be important differences in the specific political economy dynamics for these
policy areas compared to decarbonization. Articulating and implementing a research agenda
in these areas is a pressing concern, but outside of our current project for now.
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DECARBONIZATION AND CLIMATE POLICY: HOW CARROTS
BUY STICKS

To help explain our research agenda, we first define what
we mean by decarbonization. We use this term to refer to the
substantial reduction and potential elimination of carbon dioxide
emissions19 from human economic activity generally and from
energy production specifically. Our analysis examines the
policies that could lead to such decarbonization; it does not
examine actual physical changes in emissions. We use the term
“decarbonization” when we refer to long-term processes of policy
development for energy systems transformation toward a lowcarbon energy system. When we talk about concrete policies, we
use the term “climate policy.” Climate policies are those that
encourage the growth of carbon-neutral energy sources and
related economic activities, or the decline of fossil fuel-based
energy sources and related economic activities.20
Our analysis, as noted above, is a dynamic one—in
contrast to much of the existing policy literature.21
Comparative analysis of climate policy has predominantly been
a static analysis of policies’ technical or economic optimalities.
We engage with, and contribute to, a small but growing body of
literature in law, political science, and innovation studies that
engages with the temporal dynamics of climate policymaking
and energy systems transformation.22 A dynamic perspective on
19 The general motivator for research into decarbonization is the desire to
better understand and support climate change mitigation. Climate change is also
driven by a number of other greenhouse gases like methane, which are often measured
and expressed as CO2-equivalents. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 1, at 11–14, 54–55, 58–59. Carbon dioxide is, however, the most
important pollutant associated with core nonagricultural economic activities such as
power generation and transportation. See id. Hence for simplicity we focus on CO2
emissions in this research program.
20 CIPLET ET AL., supra note 11, at 133–51; DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL
WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE
PLANET 63–72 (2011).
21 See supra note 18. For some early exceptions, see Rachel Brewster,
Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change
Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 252–55 (2010); Brian J. Cook, Arenas of
Power in Climate Change Policymaking, 38 POL’Y STUD. J. 465, 468 (2010); Melissa J.
Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 64–71 (2013) (Durkee focuses on a type
of treaty she refers to as “persuasion treaties,” treaties that require governments to
change the behavior of other third-party actors, such as private industry, in order to
fulfill treaty goals. She argues that persuasion treaty success may depend on a
dynamic interaction between state and private actors to align private interests with
treaty goals.).
22 Jon
Hovi et al., Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time
Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 20, 21–
23 (2009); Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems:
Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 POL’Y SCI.
123, 145 (2012).
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climate policy development considers how climate policies can
become more or less attainable over time within varying contexts.
For instance, historical-institutionalist accounts of renewable
energy policies in Germany and the United States have shown
that the extent to which policies create economic interest groups
affects the durability and the level of entrenchment of a policy.23
In a similar vein, research on climate policy legislation in the
United States has demonstrated that the emergence of proregulatory coalitions varies depending on institutional history.24
Finally, research examines how political competition mitigates
path dependence in renewable energy policy.25
Our approach to the temporal dynamics of climate policy
connects the political science literature on American political
development—which focuses on path dependence—with the
potential for feedback effects from the enactment of laws and
policies. This feedback can entrench existing law and policy,
facilitate the expansion of that law and policy, or leave law and
policy vulnerable to repeal.26 American political science
literature on path dependence and feedback in politics draws, in
part, on earlier work in the areas of economics, business, and
technology.27 For instance, economic sociologists have analyzed
23 Frank N. Laird & Christoph Stefes, The Diverging Paths of German and
United States Policies for Renewable Energy: Sources of Difference, 37 ENERGY POL’Y
2619, 2619, 2626–28 (2009); see Leah C. Stokes, Power Politics: Renewable Energy
Policy Change in US States 125–234 (June 29, 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/99079
(follow “Download” hyperlink).
24 Knox-Hayes, supra note 13, at 547–48, 559.
25 Michaël Aklin & Johannes Urpelainen, Political Competition, Path
Dependence, and the Strategy of Sustainable Energy Transitions, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI.
643, 655 (2013); Marion Dumas et al., Political Competition and Renewable Energy
Transitions over Long Time Horizons: A Dynamic Approach, 124 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
175, 184 (2016).
26 For some of the leading literature, see ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT
RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 3–11 (2008)
(providing an overview of the key literature and noting potential application to climate
change context); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Business Power and Social Policy:
Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State, 30 POL. & SOC’Y 277, 305–
13 (2002) (describing the importance of feedback effects in the context of Social
Security policy history). For an overview of the concept, see generally PAUL PIERSON,
POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17–34 (2004); Paul
Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 14
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 74–79 (2000); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000).
27 A seminal work in this area is W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS
AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994). For a survey of the different forms of
arguments about how path dependence might occur, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 622–50 (2001) (identifying increasing returns,
evolutionary, and sequencing versions of path dependence). The political science
literature has drawn on many of these versions of path dependence, and many of these
will be relevant to our own work.
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feedback mechanisms in the institutionalization of markets.28
Because of their emphasis on positive feedback dynamics like
increasing returns to scale, these strands of literature often
focus on how such dynamics tend to entrench or lock in
patterns of economics, politics, or behavior. Such concepts have
been applied to the area of climate and carbon policy to explain
the entrenchment of the fossil fuels-based economy.29 There is,
however, some recent interest in applying the path dependence
literature to explain (and support) change rather than stasis.30
Accordingly, we are interested in how early policymaking
choices can actually change the politics surrounding subsequent
policy choices over time and therefore affect their potential
attainability and effectiveness. What kinds of policy or legal
tools, if enacted at time n, are more likely to facilitate greater
reductions of carbon dioxide emissions from energy production
at time n+1 or later? This process might proceed directly
through, for example, policies that are explicitly designed to
ratchet up over time, like a carbon tax that is statutorily
mandated to increase. However, we are far more interested in
indirect effects; that is, where policy or legal tools enacted at
time n facilitate the enactment of future policy or legal tools in
time n+1 that are more effective and, in turn, facilitate even
greater reductions of carbon dioxide emissions at time n+2. For
ease of analysis, in much of our research we have and will focus
on the first two steps in this indirect process: when do policy or
legal tools enacted at time n facilitate the development of
additional policies and when do legal tools enacted at time n+1
lead to even greater reductions in carbon dioxide emissions?31
Our preliminary analyses have been quite promising in
developing initial tentative understandings about how the
dynamic nature of the political economy of decarbonization
operates. Based on three separate individual studies, we have
independently identified the crucial role that dynamic analyses
of political economy play in understanding climate policy
outcomes. Jonas Meckling examined the evolution of coalitions
in support of emissions trading at the international level, in
both the EU and the United States. He showed how incumbent
28 Neil Fligstein & Alec Stone Sweet, Constructing Polities and Markets: An
Institutionalist Account of European Integration, 107 AM. J. SOC. 1206, 1213 (2002).
29 See, e.g., Unruh, supra note 8, at 817–18.
30 Levin et al., supra note 22, at 124.
31 Accordingly,
we often rely on policies as proxies for success in
decarbonization. If a policy enacted today prompts enactment in the future of an even
more aggressive policy, then we assume that there will be long-term success in reduction
of carbon dioxide emissions. We examine the consequences of that assumption being
wrong, infra Section III.A.
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energy and energy-intensive manufacturing firms shifted their
political strategy from opposing climate regulation to advocating
emissions trading as their preferred policy instrument.32 These
firms have thus hedged against the higher compliance cost of
alternative regulatory instruments.33 With growing demand for
climate action, the advocacy of incumbent firms has thus led to a
low-cost, market-based compliance regime. The history of both
the EU’s and the United States’ failures to pass carbon taxes on
the one hand, and the growing demand for climate regulation on
the other, set the backdrop for the emergence of coalitions in
favor of emissions trading systems.34
Eric Biber examined the political dynamics of California’s
decarbonization process through a focused case study on an
effort to repeal AB 32, the state’s groundbreaking law restricting
greenhouse gas emissions.35 In 2010, voters faced ballot
initiative Proposition 23, which would have effectively repealed
AB 32.36 However, AB 32 had been enacted in the context of
decades of state laws and policies that encouraged the growth of
renewable energy and reduced the dependence of major players,
such as electricity utilities, on fossil fuels.37 As a result,
supporters of Proposition 23 relied almost exclusively on support
from out-of-state oil companies, and subsequently lost by almost
twenty points in the election.38 Biber noted the importance of the
history of past legal and policy choices in making it possible to
enact AB 32 in the first place, and to make that legislation
resilient to pressure, even at the height of the Great Recession.39
Nina Kelsey’s work drew on a comparative analysis of
the successful global efforts to control the emissions of ozonedepleting substances and the troubled efforts to advance
decarbonization at both the international and national levels.40
MECKLING, supra note 13, at 103–66.
Jonas Meckling, Oppose, Support, or Hedge? Distributional Effects,
Regulatory Pressure, and Business Strategy in Environmental Politics, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL. 19, 23–24 (2015).
34 Jonas Meckling, The Globalization of Carbon Trading: Transnational
Business Coalitions in Climate Politics, 11 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 26, 27 (2011).
35 Biber, supra note 10.
36 Id. at 400.
37 Id. at 420–25.
38 Id. at 400, 411–20.
39 Id. at 401–25. The Proposition 23 case study makes clear that a dynamic
analysis is important in understanding not just how future progress in decarbonization
can be pursued, but also how existing decarbonization steps can be resilient against
efforts to roll them back.
40 Sarah Manina Kelsey, The Green Spiral: Policy-Industry Feedback and the
Success of International Environmental Negotiation 1–2 (Fall 2014) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), http://www.brie.berkeley.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Kelsey-Full-Dissertation-Final-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5G34-LKSN].
32
33
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She similarly argued for the importance of policy choice history,
specifically for a process of positive feedback between initial
policy moves, resulting developments in affected industry and
economic interest groups, and subsequent policymaking.41 If
initial policy moves act to change industry interests with regard
to regulation—for instance, by triggering capital investment in
regulation-adapted production assets—they can increase the
political viability of stronger or deeper subsequent regulation. A
history of such feedback processes underpins a number of cases
of strong current emissions regulation.
Based on her comparative analysis, Kelsey suggested that
the potential for such feedback processes can be better understood
by examining the types of economic interest groups in play and
their potential attitudes toward and responses to initial policy
moves.42 She proposed a four-part framework of interest groups
and how they relate to a decarbonization transition. “Winners”
and “Losers” are those interest groups that have clear-cut positive
or negative interests in regulation—in the climate change area,
examples would include solar panel manufacturers and coal
producers, respectively.43 “Substitutable”—which might also be
referred to as “Convertible” groups—are those that begin with
interests in polluting products or processes but can be converted
to have interests in nonpolluting products or processes. One
important example in the context of international efforts to
protect the ozone layer was manufacturers of chlorofluorcarbons
for refrigeration and other industrial uses in the 1980s that
switched to manufacturing substitutes that did not deplete
ozone. In the climate context, an example is utilities that shift
their asset-base from fossil fuels generation facilities to
renewable energy generation.44 Finally, some impacted groups
can be classified as “Management” groups. These are groups
that primarily interact with a pollutant by using it or its results
(e.g., fossil fuel-based electricity) as one input to their processes,
meaning that regulation may require them to manage these
inputs more carefully. They will tend to resist rising prices for
inputs due to regulation but do not otherwise have direct
interests in polluting or nonpolluting products or processes.45
Kelsey concluded that the mix of industries between these
categories can dictate the available avenues for feedback; for
instance, a high concentration of convertible Substitutable
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id. at 80–82.
Id.
Id. at 81.
Id.
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groups may make it easier for initial policies to trigger
feedback and lock in gains.46
As a group, we took the initial step of moving beyond case
studies by examining decarbonization policy sequences in fiftyfour countries and subnational jurisdictions that had enacted
some sort of carbon pricing system, the decarbonization policy
that economists identify as the most economically efficient.47 Our
question was to what extent did countries successfully begin
decarbonization through the enactment of carbon pricing, or
whether they instead had to use other policies in order to lay the
political groundwork for effective carbon pricing. We found that
for thirty-five (nearly two-thirds) of these jurisdictions, the first
decarbonization policies were direct regulatory interventions:
direct incentives for the growth of green industries such as
renewable energy through tools like feed-in tariffs and
renewable portfolio standards. Moreover, of the remaining
nineteen jurisdictions, thirteen were either countries that
entered into the European Union after it had adopted a cap-andtrade carbon regulatory system and therefore were required to
adopt carbon pricing, or were countries that had naturally lowcarbon energy sources prior to enacting carbon pricing (with a
percentage of nuclear plus hydroelectric power substantially
above global levels).48
Our interpretation of these results is that first, carbon
pricing instruments tend to be politically difficult to enact as
first steps in jurisdictions dependent on fossil fuel power. And
second, as a result of those difficulties, policies that build up
interest groups that support decarbonization are more likely to
be effective initial policy tools than policies that penalize fossil
fuel polluters or consumers. In other words, policy history,
sequencing, and feedback processes matter. Policies that benefit
renewable energy interest groups through subsidies and similar
tools, for example, will not produce the same kind of sharp
political resistance as carbon pricing that raises the costs and
directly threatens the existence of interest groups such as coal or
oil companies or electric utilities that rely heavily on fossil fuel
combustion.49 Hence, efforts to lead with carbon pricing may
ultimately be ineffectual.
Any carbon pricing that is likely to succeed despite the
dogged resistance of powerful interest groups will tend to be
46
47
48
49

Id. at 82.
Meckling et al., supra note 16, at 1170.
Id.
Levin et al., supra note 22, at 140–44.
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weak, either with many loopholes or with a minimal price level.
Such a pricing scheme is unlikely to incentivize the kinds of
changes in investments that are needed to move an entire
energy system towards decarbonization. For instance, recent
research has shown that the EU Emissions Trading System led
only to a two percent increase in low-carbon technology
patenting compared to a business-as-usual scenario.50 Moreover,
low-pricing levels are unlikely to inspire the kinds of substantial
changes in major investments that will drive fundamental
changes in interest group positions around the low-carbon
transformation of energy systems.51
In fact, it is this last point that we argue is most crucial.
An initial, weak carbon-pricing scheme could, in theory, be
followed by a more rigorous and effective one. However, that
would require a change in the political landscape that was so
resistant to a rigorous carbon-pricing system in the first place.
Such a change will only occur if new interest groups that are
friendlier to decarbonization are created and supported or if
existing interest groups can be made friendlier to
decarbonization.52 One of the most important ways to shift
interest group perspectives on energy law and policy is through
shaping the investments made by those interest groups.53 An
interest group that has made investments based on policies that
support decarbonization is more likely to support future laws
and policies designed to facilitate greater decarbonization. That
could be true for brand new interest groups (e.g., renewable
energy equipment manufacturers or independent power
producers) or for existing interest groups (e.g., incumbent electric
utilities that shift their generation from fossil fuel combustion to
renewable energy). But again, such a shift requires incentives to
invest based on decarbonization policies. Weak carbon policies are
unlikely to produce such incentives.54
But targeted green industrial policies can provide
substantial incentives to make concrete capital investments in
renewable energy.55 These incentives therefore nurture the
growth of new interest groups friendly to decarbonization and
encourage existing interest groups to shift their relationship to
50 Raphael Calel & Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Environmental Policy and
Directed Technological Change: Evidence from the European Carbon Market, 98 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 173, 182–83 (2016).
51 Meckling et al., supra note 16, at 1171.
52 Id.
53 Id.; see also Biber, supra note 10, at 423–24; Kelsey, supra note 40, at 3–6.
54 Meckling et al., supra note 16, at 1170.
55 See Hubert Schmitz et al., Rent Management—The Heart of Green
Industrial Policy, 20 NEW POL. ECON. 812 (2015).
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decarbonization, as those interest groups accumulate capital in
regulation-adapted investments. This may result in what
Robert Keohane has called a “clean energy industrial complex.”56
These clean energy interests are a new source of demand for
policies that contribute to emission reductions. That, in turn,
can lead to further advances in law and policy—including,
eventually, carbon pricing.57
Our results in our prior work provide support for the
theory that “carrots buy sticks”; green industrial and
innovation policy laid the political groundwork for enacting
carbon-pricing systems in the majority of countries that have
enacted carbon pricing. Moreover, green industrial and
innovation policy—because it is more politically feasible—has
been far more widely adopted in all countries; as of 2013, at
least 132 countries and subnational jurisdictions have either a
feed-in tariff or a renewable portfolio standard.58
II.

A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR UNDERSTANDING THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECARBONIZATION

The broad conceptual recognition that feedback matters
and carrots can buy sticks leaves a great deal of ground to be
explored. Our research agenda will build on these initial steps to
answer a series of important questions about how the political
economy dynamics of decarbonization will unfold. Below we
develop the key questions we plan on investigating further,
drawing on existing literature to motivate the questions and to
identify tentative hypotheses. We aim to address both the
questions of how and under what circumstances history
“matters;” does it vary by context or sector? We identify a
number of key contexts, including resource base and economic
structure, political systems, technology and policy instrument
choices, and diffusion among jurisdictions. How does crossjurisdictional variation in those variables shape or constrain
policymaking dynamics in climate politics? Can we identify
56 Robert O. Keohane, The Global Politics of Climate Change: Challenge for
Political Science, 48 POL. SCI. & POL. 19, 22 (2015).
57 Some prior studies have found no relationship between renewable energy
interest group lobbying and renewable energy production in U.S. states. See Magali A.
Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for Renewable Energy: Context
and Effectiveness, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 2273, 2278, 2281 (2011); Hongtao Yi & Richard C.
Feiock, Renewable Energy Politics: Policy Typologies, Policy Tools, and State
Deployment of Renewables, 42 POL’Y STUD. J. 391, 409–11 (2014). Our hypothesis is
that these results are the product of contextual variation along the lines we intend to
explore—and we hope to unearth when, exactly, interest group lobbying is more likely
to be effective in advancing carbon policy.
58 Meckling et al., supra note 16, at 1170.
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particular policy pathways that work in certain contexts but not
in others? Our research strategy thus connects research on
comparative climate politics with a dynamic perspective on
political development.59
A.

Importance of Energy Resource Base and Economy

The nature of a state’s energy resource base and the
energy resources that are used to power its economy likely
have significant connections to the political economy of
decarbonization. How a state’s economy is structured will be an
important determinant of the initial composition and relative
power of interest groups in the state. Whether fossil fuels or
renewable energy is a key component of that state’s economy
should have implications for the interest group landscape in
that state and for the potential evolution of political coalitions.
1. The Role of Fossil Fuel Production and Use
At a most basic level, one might expect that a state will
be more resistant to imposing significant restrictions on fossil
fuel use or consumption if it is heavily dependent on fossil fuel
production or export industries for revenue.60 Similarly, one
would expect that states for which fossil fuels are essential as
inputs for the domestic economy—e.g., for electricity
production—might be more resistant to decarbonization
policies because few interest groups would find it beneficial to
support them.
These basic hypotheses seem to be borne out in the
context of coal: jurisdictions with significant coal resources
seem to be less likely to support decarbonization policies. For
instance, in the United States, states such as West Virginia,
Kentucky, and Wyoming—all of which have substantial coal
59 Our research focuses on how changes in economic interests might shape
politics. We do appreciate that political preferences with respect to climate policy and
decarbonization will independently shape how governments react. See, e.g., David E.
Adelman & David B. Spence, Cost-Benefit Politics of U.S. Energy Policy 2–4 (Kay
Bailey Hutchison, Ctr. for Energy, Law & Business, Research Paper No. 2015-12, 2015)
(noting that political partisanship is as important as economic interests in determining
which U.S. states are challenging federal climate policies). To some extent, we hope to
address the role of political preferences through our examination of political structures,
as discussed infra Section II.B. We also believe that to some extent changes in
economic interests will shape political preferences over time. See Adelman & Spence,
supra, at 42–49 (noting how the changes in costs for electric utilities around climate
policy may cause public preferences and political positions to shift rapidly).
60 Erick Lachapelle & Matthew Paterson, Drivers of National Climate Policy,
13 CLIMATE POL’Y 547, 565 tbl.6 (2013) (finding that countries that are significant
exporters of fossil fuels are less likely to adopt climate change policies).
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production and use coal in significant amounts for electricity
production—have minimal or no decarbonization policies.61 But
there are counterexamples. Germany is a global climate policy
leader despite having a substantial domestic coal industry and
despite relying on coal for a significant amount of its electricity
production.62 One question is whether there is some threshold
above which coal production makes the politics of decarbonization
extremely difficult. Jurisdictions such as Germany, or in the
United States, Illinois, that have substantial coal resources but
still a relatively diversified energy portfolio63 may still have a
political economy amenable to decarbonization.
Coal is the fossil fuel that creates the most adverse
political economy context for decarbonization because it
produces more carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy
produced than any other fossil fuel; it has also historically been
61 See U.S. States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/state/
rankings/?sid=US#/series/48 [https://perma.cc/K4UE-RREH]; Kentucky, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=KY#tabs-4 [https://perma.cc/H47Z-DHPG];
West Virginia, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=WV#tabs-4
[https://perma.cc/E5S4-EE3Z]; Wyoming, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.
gov/state/?sid=WY#tabs-4 [https://perma.cc/6NBZ-RK59]. Kentucky has neither a
renewable portfolio standard nor a feed-in tariff. Kentucky, supra. West Virginia did
enact an RPS in 2009 but repealed it in 2015. West Virginia, supra. Wyoming has
neither an RPS nor an FIT, although it nonetheless does have substantial wind
generation development due to favorable geographic considerations. Wyoming, supra.
This data is based on EIA data. For RPS data, see Most States Have Renewable
Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 [https://perma.cc/249X-VEYB]. For FIT data, see
Feed-In Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity
Technologies, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayin
energy/detail.cfm?id=11471 [https://perma.cc/D8RL-E5Z5]; Feed-In Tariffs and Similar
Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
policies/provider_programs.cfm [https://perma.cc/448D-2WG8]; see also Jocelyn
Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfoliostandards.aspx [https://perma.cc/X6RF-LZS7]. According to DSIRE, all of these states do
have miscellaneous support policies such as access regulations, grants or loans, tax
credits, and so on, but this is pretty typical for U.S. states, and none of them appear to
rise to the level of major policy initiatives. See Programs, DSIRE, http://programs.dsire
usa.org/system/program [https://perma.cc/S27S-7UKE]. For the EIA’s electricity capacity
data by state as of 2015, see Detailed State Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://
www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ [https://perma.cc/F53E-63XG].
62 See International Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.
eia.gov/beta/international/rankings/#?prodact=7-1&cy=2014 [https://perma.cc/8CWT-LR
4A] (listing Germany as the eighth largest producer of coal in the world); cf. Daniel C.
Matisoff, The Adoption of State Climate Change Policies and Renewable Portfolio
Standards: Regional Diffusion or Internal Determinants?, 25 REV. POL’Y RES. 527, 539–43
(2008) (finding mixed results as to whether coal and natural gas production combined is
correlated with renewable energy policy adoption in U.S. states).
63 See BP, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2016, at 30 (2016),
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-sta
tistical-review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ36-Y49V]; U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2015, at 12 & tbl.6 (2016), https://www.eia.
gov/coal/annual/pdf/acr.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDB4-SC43].
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the cheapest fossil fuel to produce and burn.64 It is plausible
that other fossil fuels will pose less of an obstacle—at least to
initial decarbonization steps. Lyon and Yin, however, did find
that oil and natural gas production in U.S. states was
negatively correlated with whether a state had adopted a
renewable portfolio standard.65
Just because policy may be more difficult in states with
fossil fuel dominated economies does not mean that the policy
is not important. Indeed, two scholars found that strategic
policy development is far more important to an effective longterm decarbonization program in a state that might be hostile
to renewables because of cheap fossil fuel energy.66
2. The Role of Renewable Energy Potential
Reciprocally, one would expect that higher levels of
renewable energy resources—ample sun or wind, for example—
would make a state more politically amenable to decarbonization
policies. There is both anecdotal evidence of this—it is no surprise
that British Columbia was a leader in enacting a carbon tax when
it obtains over 90% of its electricity from hydropower67—and
quantitative evidence.68 But there are also contrary anecdotes.
Florida has lots of sun, but it lags in developing decarbonization
policies.69 And there are also contrary quantitative studies,
64 Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced per
Kilowatthour When Generating Electricity with Fossil Fuels?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=74&t=11 [https://perma.cc/GE2L-BHQA] (last
updated Feb. 29, 2016); Coal Explained: Coal Prices and Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_prices [https://perma.
cc/CD49-X8F8] (last updated Aug. 10, 2016 ) (identifying coal as the least expensive fossil
fuel used for electricity generation).
65 Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio
Standards?: An Empirical Investigation, 31 ENERGY J. 131, 148–50 (2010).
66 Aklin & Urpelainen, supra note 25, at 644, 655.
67 Our Facilities, BC HYDRO, http://www.bchydro.com/energy-in-bc/our_system/
generation/our_facilities.html [https://perma.cc/EB4H-DT82].
68 Steffen Jenner et al., What Drives States to Support Renewable Energy?, 33
ENERGY J. 1, 7–9 (2012) (finding strong correlation between solar potential and
adoption of RPS by EU member states); Lyon & Yin, supra note 65, at 150–51 (finding
that U.S. states with more wind and solar potential are more likely to enact an RPS);
Matisoff, supra note 62, at 539–43 (finding that greater solar potential in a U.S. state
means the state is more likely to enact an RPS, but finding less strong correlation with
wind potential).
69 See Matthew Lombardi et al., Geographic Variation in Potential of Rooftop
Residential Photovoltaic Electric Power Production in the United States, FLA. SOLAR
ENERGY CTR., http://www.fsec.ucf.edu/en/publications/html/FSEC-PF-380-04 [https://
perma.cc/HJ2B-4MLW] (noting high level of solar potential in Florida); State Solar
Policy, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/state-solar-policy/florida [https://
perma.cc/LZ9F-7JG2] (noting that Florida is third in the United States in rooftop solar
energy potential but fourteenth in solar energy capacity). Florida has no RPS or any
other renewable energy targets. See Durkay, supra note 61; Feed-In Tariff: A Policy
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particularly in finding correlations between renewable energy
potential and renewable energy production.70
The mixed results demonstrate that any analysis likely
has to be more nuanced. One may need to consider the
interaction of fossil fuels with renewables, rather than looking at
each separately. For instance, low levels of all energy resources,
both fossil fuel and renewable, may make a state more amenable
to renewable energy policy, perhaps out of a lack of options or
because the price differential between (imported) fossil fuels
and renewable energy is smaller.71
Different kinds of renewable energy resources may also
be more or less amenable to building up interest groups to change
the political economy of a state. Wind power tends to be produced
through large, utility-scale facilities, not through distributed
generation; in contrast, solar power is more likely to be produced
through distributed generation, although there is still a substantial
utility-scale component to solar energy.72 Utility-scale generation
facilities will be developed by larger corporations—either
incumbent utilities or independent power producers—who may
have greater sway in the political process due to their small
numbers and greater resources, which make it easier to exert
Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity Technologies, supra note 61;
State Solar Policy, supra. The state has also terminated its rebate program for solar
installation by consumers and greatly reduced energy efficiency programs. Ivan Penn,
Florida Regulators Approve Plan to Gut Energy Efficiency Goals, End Solar Power
Rebates, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/
energy/florida-regulators-meet-to-decide-future-of-energy-efficiency-and-solar/2207845
[https://perma.cc/3XNE-U52L].
70 See, e.g., Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 57, at 2278, 2281 (finding that
wind potential was positively correlated with renewable energy policy, but that solar
potential had opposite correlations for some types of renewable energy policies, and also
finding no correlation between wind and solar potential and level of renewable energy
production in a state); Yi & Feiock, supra note 57, at 409–11 (finding no correlation between
renewable energy resources and level of renewable energy production in U.S. states).
71 For instance, New Jersey has a significant renewable energy policy
commitment with an RPS requirement of approximately 25% by 2021; New Jersey’s solar
and on-shore wind resources are not terribly strong, but it also lacks substantial internal
fossil fuel or hydro resources. See New Jersey, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.
gov/state/?sid=NJ#tabs-4 [https://perma.cc/G7NG-RRPP]. Currently only a small fraction
of New Jersey’s electricity comes from nonnuclear renewable energy. See id. However, the
share of its electricity market occupied by distributed solar generation, though small in
an absolute sense, is unusually high as a share of market relative even to states with
much better solar resources. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) lists
New Jersey’s capacity factor for utility-scale photovoltaics, which we use as a proxy for
solar potential, as 0.200. ANTHONY LOPEZ ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S.
RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNICAL POTENTIALS: A GIS-BASED ANALYSIS 25 (2012),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/51946.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5CN-R6SS]. This puts it
right in the middle of the pack among U.S. states, in contrast with its very strong
showing in terms of actual distributed solar deployment. See id.; New Jersey, supra.
72 Nina Kelsey & Jonas Meckling, Winners and Losers in Renewable Energy:
Evidence from Europe and the United States 16 (unpublished draft manuscript) (on file
with authors).
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coordinated and effective influence over policymaking. On the
other hand, there is evidence that distributed generation73 can
spread the revenues from renewable energy broadly in ways
that can mobilize large numbers of citizens to support renewable
energy.74 We discuss this question in more detail below.75
Wind power is also cheaper than solar in general.76 As a
result, it may be politically easier to support and, indeed, may
no longer even require substantial amounts of public subsidies
or other public policies to support.77 Solar, on the other hand,
often still requires substantial public intervention to be
competitive in the marketplace.78 Does this suggest that a
policy targeted at solar may be more effective at broadening the
existing coalition for green policy in ways that are additional to
business-as-usual trends?79
3. Choice of Energy Sectors, Energy Trade Status, and
Broader Industry Structure
The political economy dynamics are likely also sector
specific. For instance, Texas has been the leader in the
73 In contrast to utility-scale generation, which refers to large-scale “bulk”
generation facilities whose electricity output is routed to many users over a wide-area
electrical grid, distributed generation consists of small generation sources such as rooftop
solar installations that are dispersed throughout the grid and typically designed to meet
the generation needs of specific users. See discussion infra Section II.D.
74 See discussion infra Section II.D.
75 See infra Section II.D.
76 Paul L. Joskow, Comparing the Costs of Intermittent and Dispatchable
Electricity Generating Technologies, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 238, 239–
41 (2011).
77 Kelsey & Meckling, supra note 72.
78 See id. at 17. Prior research suggests that RPS policies are more closely
associated with solar power than mandatory green power option policies (MGPOs), in
which regulated utilities are required to give consumers the option of purchasing
“green” electricity. Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 57, at 2278, 2281.
79 One explanation for why wind power, but not solar power, has grown so
much in Texas is that Texas’s climate policy was a simple renewable portfolio standard
that did not distinguish among renewable sources. See Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of
Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and
Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 80 (2016). Thus, the cheapest renewable energy
(wind) was the dominant beneficiary of the policy. Id. Texas did include a minimum for
solar production for utilities, but this has had minimal impact, in part because the
state regulatory agency believes that it does not have authority to enforce it. See Order
Denying Petition for Initiation of Rulemaking Proceedings, Petition of Sierra Club et
al. to Amend Section 25.173 to Increase the Renewable Portfolio Standard for Nonwind Resources to 3,000 MW by 2025 and to Ensure Effective Implementation of the
Standard, PUC Project No. 40740 (Tex. P.U.C. Nov. 2, 2012); Order Adopting
Amendment to § 25.173 as Approved at the July 25, 2007 Open Meeting, Rulemaking
Relating to the Target for Renewable Energy Resources Other than Wind Power,
Project No. 33492 (Tex. P.U.C. Jan. 29, 2007); Proposal for Publication of Amendments
to § 25.109, § 25.173 and § 25.211 for Consideration at the December 16, 2010 Open
Meeting (Tex. P.U.C. Jan. 2011).
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promotion and installation of wind power in the United States,
despite also being the largest producer of oil and natural gas in
the United States.80 However, this may not be an accident: Wind
power primarily serves electricity, while the oil sector in Texas
serves transportation.81 Granted, natural gas production is the
largest source of energy for electricity in Texas;82 but because
natural gas is substantially lower-emission than either coal or
oil, its incentives regarding green policy are likely mixed. Texas
does produce and use some coal in electricity production, though
not as much as states such as Wyoming or West Virginia; coal
might be a more important competitor with wind power both
economically and politically.83
The role of fossil fuel production in a state’s political
economy might also depend heavily on whether that fossil fuel
is consumed within the state or primarily exported. If a state
primarily exports its fossil fuel, most current regulatory regimes
do not take into account the greenhouse gases produced by its
consumption since that consumption occurs outside the state’s
borders.84 Instead, only the greenhouse gas emissions from
production (e.g., fugitive methane from oil and gas extraction) are
counted towards the regulatory structure.85 Given this, it is not
surprising that states such as British Columbia and Norway,
which primarily export their fossil fuel production and rely
heavily on hydropower for domestic electricity production, have
imposed significant carbon taxes or other regulatory systems on
domestic carbon emissions.86 Such states can have their
regulatory cake and eat it too, profiting from fossil fuel exports
while regulating at home. There are minimal economic and
political impacts from them doing so, although the net global
decarbonization benefits of their policies may be limited.87
Finally, does the economic structure beyond the energy
sector matter for the extent to which green industry interests can
emerge and grow? Both California and Germany—the two classic
cases of progressive climate policy expansion—are economies
80 Texas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=TX [https://
perma.cc/5HJW-AP94] (noting Texas leadership in both wind power and oil and gas
production).
81 See id.
82 Id.
83 Id. (showing Texas electricity production by energy source, with coal slightly
ahead of wind power); U.S. States, supra note 61 (showing Wyoming and West Virginia as
by far the two largest coal producers in the United States, with Texas seventh).
84 See Kathryn Harrison, International Carbon Trade and Domestic Climate
Politics, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 27, 33, 39–44 (2015).
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 Id. (describing this dynamic).
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with substantial industrial capabilities,88 which they could
leverage in developing renewable energy industries. Economies
without industrial capabilities may not have export-oriented
manufacturing interests that could support renewable energy
policies. Instead, project developers, installers, farmers, and
homeowners may be more important as potential green interests.
How does this variation in economic structure affect the strength
and durability of coalitions for climate policy?
B.

Importance of Political Structures

Another fundamental characteristic of different states
that might shape the political economy of decarbonization is
the political structure of the state. At the most basic level,
democracies have proven to be more likely to adopt feed-in tariffs
for renewable energy deployment than autocracies.89 Democratic
governments have political incentives to adopt policies like feed-in
tariffs that improve environmental quality, promote rural
development, and distribute the benefits from electricity production
to a large number of producers.90 Democratic governments thus
benefit from adopting policies that build support within a large set
of constituencies.91
1. Parliamentary Versus Presidential Systems
Within democracies, a fundamental difference in
political structures is between parliamentary and presidential
political systems.92 Parliamentary systems tend to have fewer
88 California is the world’s sixth largest economy; Germany the world’s fourth
largest economy. California’s Economy Is Bigger than All but Five Nations, World Bank
Data Says, MERCURY NEWS, http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_30093287/californi
as-economy-is-bigger-than-all-but-five [https://perma.cc/4NYE-MRNM] (last updated Aug.
11, 2016); GDP Ranking, THE WORLD BANK (Feb. 1, 2017), http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/download/GDP.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK5D-VDKA]. The 2016 California Green
Innovation Index found that California ranked first in 2015 among U.S. states in both
clean technology patenting and percentage of total U.S. clean technology venture
capital investment. F. NOEL PERRY ET AL., NEXT 10, CALIFORNIA GREEN INNOVATION
INDEX 32, 35 (2016), http://next10.org/sites/next10.org/files/2016-california-green-innovation
-index-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F3Z-L6CB]. Next 10’s international edition of the same
index for 2015 also cites Germany as a leader in clean technology patenting, as well as
having the largest total amount of electricity generation from renewable sources in
Europe. F. NOEL PERRY ET AL., NEXT 10, CALIFORNIA GREEN INNOVATION INDEX
INTERNATIONAL EDITION 35, 45 (2015), http://www.next10.org/sites/next10.org/files/2015Green-Innovation-Index.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EXN-JFLE].
89 See Patrick Bayer & Johannes Urpelainen, It Is All About Political
Incentives: Democracy and the Renewable Feed-in Tariff, 78 J. POL. 603 (2016).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 In parliamentary systems, voters select members of a legislature, which in turn
determines the executive. In presidential systems, voters independently select both the
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veto points for law and policymaking, which may make it easier
to establish decarbonization policies.93 But for the same reason,
these systems may also make it easier to repeal or undermine
decarbonization policies. In other words, political structure is
likely to affect both the potential to take initial steps that could
shift constituencies and the potential for those steps to undergo
substantive, durable implementation.
To illustrate with examples, British Columbia is
sometimes identified as a leader in enacting climate policy, and it
has a parliamentary political structure.94 But another
parliamentary jurisdiction, Australia, after enacting a carbonpricing scheme in 2011, quickly reversed course after a change
in government and repealed the measure three years later.95 In
the United States, the many veto points required to enact
legislation (passage through two different legislative chambers,
an effective supermajority requirement in the Senate, and
legislature and the executive. Our research agenda currently focuses on decarbonization
policy in democracies. Of course, there is essential work in decarbonization to be done in
authoritarian systems as well, such as the People’s Republic of China.
93 For instance, there is literature indicating that parliamentary systems might
be more effective in developing climate policies. See Lachapelle & Paterson, supra note 60,
at 549, 564 (summarizing the literature and finding that parliamentary systems are
somewhat more likely to enact national climate policies than presidential systems).
94 See Kathryn Harrison, A Tale of Two Taxes: The Fate of Environmental
Tax Reform in Canada, 29 REV. POL’Y RES. 383, 383–84 (2012).
95 See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.) (repealed 2014). The Australian
Parliament passed the Act by only a slight majority. Peter D. Burdon, A Change in the
Weather? Australia and Climate Change Politics 2007–2014, in ETHICS AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: A STUDY OF NATIONAL COMMITMENTS 3 (Donald A. Brown & Prue Taylor eds.,
2014). The Act had an initial three-year period with a fixed carbon price ending with
the financial year 2014 (essentially a carbon tax) and then switched over to a flexible
cap-and-trade scheme. See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 4 (Austl.) (repealed 2014).
After the labor government that had enacted the law lost control in the 2013 elections,
the new conservative liberal government repealed the carbon-pricing system. See Clean
Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.). The liberal
government instead enacted a subsidy program to industry to reduce carbon emissions.
See Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.); AUSTL. GOV’T,
EMISSIONS REDUCTION FUND WHITE PAPER (2014), http://www.environment.gov.au/
system/files/resources/1f98a924-5946-404c-9510-d440304280f1/files/emissions-reductionfund-white-paper_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUY5-LXKU]. The subsidies are paired with a
requirement that large emitters not increase emissions over business-as-usual
baselines, so in theory they should result in reductions of 5% from 2000 levels by 2020,
and 26%–28% from 2005 levels by 2030. See AUSTL. MINISTER ENV’T, NATIONAL
GREENHOUSE AND ENERGY REPORTING ACT 2007: NATIONAL GREENHOUSE AND ENERGY
REPORTING (SAFEGUARD MECHANISM) RULE 2015 (2015), http://www.environment.gov.
au/system/files/pages/dbabd13c-f8f1-49cd-ab40-621f056de35a/files/es-safeguard-rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5KM-GXPH]. Australia also has had an RPS requirement for
electricity retailers since 2000, but the goals set in that RPS have fluctuated over the
years depending on the party in power. The 2000 Act set a goal of 12,500 GWh of
renewable energy by 2010. Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) s 40 (Austl.).
In 2009, the Australian Parliament increased the target to 45,850 GWh by 2020.
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) s 40 (Austl.). In 2015, the
new conservative government lowered the target to 33,000 GWh by 2021. Renewable
Energy (Electricity) Amendment Act 2015 (Cth) s 2 (Austl.).
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presidential approval) prevented the passage of carbon-pricing
legislation in 2010.96 But those veto points have also prevented
efforts to undermine or defund the use of the Clean Air Act, a
measure passed decades ago that provides EPA with broad
powers to regulate air pollution but was not specifically designed
to address atmospheric carbon to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.97 These examples demonstrate that climate policies
can be quite powerful and “sticky” once enacted, particularly in
the United States.
This dichotomy begs the question of whether—from the
perspective of advancing decarbonization—it is more important
for legislation to be easily enacted or for legislation to be resistant
to repeal or diminishment. On the one hand, society clearly will
need new laws and policies over time to advance decarbonization.
On the other hand—as noted above—a key factor in building,
converting, and empowering interest groups to support
decarbonization is encouraging those interest groups to make
major economic investments in decarbonization technologies, such
as renewable energy production, transmission infrastructure, and
energy efficient technology.98 Legislation is more likely to
encourage such investment if it is perceived to be stable over long
periods of time. In a parliamentary system, where legislation is
easier to enact but also to repeal, feedback may be more likely if a
policy targets interest groups that respond and evolve quickly
rather than those that have long investment time horizons.
But while legislation may be more difficult to repeal in
presidential systems, another factor might cut against stability
of policy in those same systems in practice. Presidential
systems are much more likely to have some form of divided
government (different parties controlling the legislature and the
executive) than parliamentary systems.99 Two scholars have
argued that presidential systems may have more unpredictable
96 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong., Reg. Sess. (2009); 155 CONG. REC. 16,492, 16,505–06 (2009) (roll call vote in the
House). This bill was known as Waxman-Markey after the two principal cosponsors in the
House of Representatives. See Cosponsors: H.R.2454—111th Congress (2009–2010),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2454/cosponsors
[https://perma.cc/RAS2-MDSP].
97 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)); see Jody Freeman & David B.
Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 17–42 (2014) (providing
an overview of how the Clean Air Act has been adapted by courts and agencies to apply
to greenhouse gas emissions).
98 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
99 Such division of power generally only exists in parliamentary systems with
a minority government, where the executive is only supported by a minority of the
members of the legislature.
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budgets to support renewable energy because divided governments
produce more uncertainty in the budgetary process.100 Thus,
political systems play an uncertain role in the political economy
of decarbonization.
2. The Role of Direct Democracy
Some states in Europe and in the United States have a
significant role for direct democracy in lawmaking, either through
referendum or initiative provisions in their constitutions. Direct
democracy may have characteristics similar to parliamentary
systems for purposes of our analysis—they may make it easier for
decarbonization legislation to be enacted but also may make it
easier for it to be repealed. At least two U.S. states, Colorado and
Washington, began their renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
programs through the initiative process, overriding recalcitrant
legislatures.101 In California, an effort to use the initiative process
to effectively repeal the state’s global warming legislation failed in
2010.102 Given the important role that direct democracy plays in a
wide range of U.S. states and in a number of European countries
such as Switzerland, understanding how direct democracy
interacts with the political economy of decarbonization will be an
important question to answer.
3. The Role of Political Party Systems
A key component of a democratic state’s political structure
is the nature of the political party system.103 For instance, does
the existence of a highly competitive political party system—in
which power regularly switches between parties—advance or
retard decarbonization policy? On the one hand, the lack of
consistent policy and law over time might undermine
incentives for investment by interest groups. On the other
hand, the competitive nature of the political process might
increase incentives for parties that support decarbonization to
invest public resources into efforts such as renewable energy

Laird & Stefes, supra note 23, at 2625–26.
See Renewable Energy Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/
system/program/detail/133 [https://perma.cc/W9SA-LZX2] (last updated Aug. 5, 2015);
Renewable Energy Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/
detail/2350 [https://perma.cc/7TG2-4KFM] (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
102 See Biber, supra note 10, at 400.
103 A state’s political system strongly influences the number, composition, and
interaction of political parties.
100

101
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production or transmission infrastructure in order to lock-in
decarbonization policy before political power shifts.104
Other relevant sources of variation in political structures
include the type of business-government relations, particularly
pluralist versus corporatist political systems, and electoral
systems, particularly majoritarian versus proportional systems.105
These multiple areas of variation present opportunities for
significant research focused on political party systems.
C.

Importance of Regulatory Structure

In many national and subnational jurisdictions,
important elements of the energy infrastructure are either
publicly owned or are subject to significant regulatory
supervision by the government.106 One question is whether and
to what extent that regulatory structure might matter for the
long-term development of decarbonization policy. Do different
types of regulatory structures constrain or increase the
potential for the development of different types of green energy
coalitions over time? In this section we focus on the regulatory
system for the electricity sector, but similar questions will need
to be addressed in other energy sectors.
1. The Importance of Deregulation of Electricity
Markets
Over the past few decades, many states have moved
toward significant deregulation of their electricity sectors,
either by privatizing previously state-owned electricity systems
or by disaggregating and deregulating transmission, generation,
and distribution in the electricity system. In the United States,
an early effort at deregulation was the enactment of PURPA in
1979—a federal law that required state public utility
See Aklin & Urpelainen, supra note 25, at 645–56.
See Kathryn Harrison & Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, The Comparative
Politics of Climate Change, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 9–11 (2007); Matto Mildenberger,
Fiddling While the World Burns: The Double Representation of Carbon Polluters in
Comparative Climate Policymaking 50–55 (Dec. 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Yale University), http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1767229990.html?FMT=AI.
106 For example, in Nebraska, the entire electricity system is owned by public
entities. Public Power—How Nebraskans Benefit, NEB. POWER ASS’N, http://www.ne
power.org [https://perma.cc/6KQZ-9JCV] (“Nebraska has the distinction of being the
only state in the U.S. where every single home and business receives electric service
from publicly owned utilities such as municipal utilities, electric cooperatives, or public
power districts.”). Many cities around the United States, such as Los Angeles, own
their electric distribution systems. See, e.g., L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER,
http://www.myladwp.com [https://perma.cc/79ED-GZVE] (website for municipal power
agency for the City of Los Angeles).
104

105
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commissions to allow limited amounts of entry into the
electricity generation market at competitive or supracompetitive
rates.107 PURPA led some states to require regulated utilities to
purchase renewable energy from independent power producers
at quite high rates. In states such as California, these programs
in the 1980s helped initiate the development of renewable
energy in a significant way.108
The process of deregulating the overall electricity market
might also have a potential role in building interest group support
for renewable energy, depending on how it is pursued. The
deregulatory process in California in the 1990s required the
regulated, monopoly, investor-owned utilities to sell off many of
their generation assets so that generation could be deregulated.109
Thus, many of the utilities divested themselves of legacy fossil
fuel-powered generation assets. By the early to mid-2000s,
California utility Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), for instance, had
a very low-carbon portfolio.110 This appears to us to have
contributed to a shift in California utilities supporting renewable
energy legislation rather than resisting it. Lyon and Yin have also
found that U.S. states with restructured electricity markets were
more likely to have RPS programs.111 It is often the case that
deregulation is packaged politically with renewable energy policy
programs of various sorts.112
In U.S. states that still have significant regulatory control
over electricity generation, regulatory barriers to entry can make
the development of renewable energy quite difficult. For instance,
in Florida, any electricity generation facility, no matter how
small, that sells electricity is required to get regulatory
approval from the state public utilities commission.113 The
upshot is that Florida’s regulatory program has significantly
inhibited the development of solar distributed generation;
homeowners do not need regulatory approval if they build and
107 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210, 92
Stat. 3117, 3144–46 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012)).
108 See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM chs. 2–3 (1999).
109 See the discussion of structural separation in JEFF LIEN, ELECTRICITY
RESTRUCTURING: WHAT HAS WORKED, WHAT HAS NOT, AND WHAT IS NEXT 6–7 (2008),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2008/04/30/232692.pdf [https://perma.
cc/D4AG-LHXQ].
110 See PG&E CORP., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2003), http://www.pgecorp.com/
investors/pdfs/2003AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYW4-SHPF].
111 Lyon & Yin, supra note 65, at 150–51.
112 Sung Eun Kim et al., Does Power Sector Deregulation Promote or
Discourage Renewable Energy Policy? Evidence from the States, 1991–2012, 33 REV.
POL’Y RES. 22, 23–24 (2016).
113 See PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 283–84 (Fla. 1988).
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own their own solar panels, but if they want to enter into a
leasing agreement with a third-party provider such as Solar
City, they must get direct approval from the state regulatory
agency.114 To the extent that the rise of distributed generation
might be an important component in shaping the political
economy of a state to advance decarbonization (as discussed
below), this barrier may be quite problematic.
This is not universally a problem in all U.S. states with
significant regulatory control over electricity generation. In
states such as Iowa, state law has been interpreted to exclude
small-scale distributed generation from regulatory approval
requirements, facilitating the development of distributed
generation.115 However, the existence and nature of substantial
regulatory power might retard the development of certain forms
of renewable energy, which in turn may significantly shape the
development of a climate-related political economy in a state.
More generally, independent power producers have
dominated renewable energy production across the board,
whether in the United States or Europe, and largely regardless
of whether individual states have adopted more or less
deregulatory systems for their electricity markets.116 But current
research does not yet make clear whether there is a strong
114 For third-party leasing solar distributed generation, the third party (such
as Solar City) retains ownership of the solar panels that it installs on the customer’s
roof; the owner of the roof accesses the power generated either by directly leasing the
panels or via a power purchase agreement (PPA) in which the customer commits to
buying the power produced by the panels for an agreed-upon period at an agreed-upon
price (typically lower than the local power company rate). See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL.,
ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 838–42 (4th ed.
2015); Third-Party Solar Financing, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/
policy/finance-tax/third-party-financing [https://perma.cc/6AXX-FRA6]. By eliminating
the need for large upfront capital investments by homeowners to install solar panels,
these programs are an important component of distributed generation. Solar Power
Purchase Agreements, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/researchresources/solar-power-purchase-agreements [https://perma.cc/CG85-GWYU]; Sharon B.
Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 526 & n.19 (2016). Third-party
ownership of PV has been estimated at 65% of the U.S. market in 2013. Carolyn
Davidson et al., Exploring the Market for Third-Party-Owned Residential Photovoltaic
Systems: Insights from Lease and Power-Purchase Agreement Contract Structures and
Costs in California, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 1, http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.108
8/1748-9326/10/2/024006/pdf [https://perma.cc/T4AC-A88R]. Further, the Solar Energy
Industries Association reports that third-party ownership accounts for 50%–81% of
distributed generation systems in Arizona, California, Colorado, and New York (as of
the first quarter of 2014), and over 90% of residential solar in New Jersey (as of the
second quarter of 2013). Third-Party Solar Financing, supra; see also Davidson et al.,
supra (data on California).
115 See SZ Enters. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 469–70 (Iowa 2014).
116 Kelsey & Meckling, supra note 72, at 1–3; see also Jenner et al., supra note
68, at 5–11 (noting the importance of renewable energy lobbying groups in advancing
renewable energy policy in the United States and EU, and their opposition in interests
to incumbent utilities); Laird & Stefes, supra note 23, at 2626–28 (noting the
importance of nonutility renewable energy generators in Germany).
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causal relationship between having a deregulated electricity
system and having more independent power production and/or
greater shares of renewable energy overall.117
2. The Importance of the Structure and Independence
of Regulatory Agencies
If there is a significant regulatory role for the state in
electricity, a follow-up question is whether the nature of the
energy regulatory body—whatever the overall scope of its
regulatory powers—matters for advancing the political economy
of decarbonization. Does a relatively independent regulatory
agency facilitate or retard the development of a favorable
political economy for decarbonization? The answer to this
question may depend in part on the extent to which regulated
utilities are seen as allies to be embraced, obstacles to be
overcome, or (more likely) important interest groups whose
position with respect to decarbonization policy may be
ambiguous and shifting at times.
If one comfortably believes that regulated utilities are
supportive of strong decarbonization policy, then a state
regulatory agency that is effectively captured by those utilities
may actually help facilitate the adoption and implementation of
aggressive decarbonization policies. On the other hand, if
regulated utilities are hostile or neutral, then a captured
regulatory agency can do a lot to interfere with the development
of helpful decarbonization policies. As noted above, in Florida, the
state public utility commission has concluded that distributed
generation provided by third parties (not property owners)
requires regulation by the agency; this conclusion has placed a
major obstacle in the development of solar distributed generation
in a state where there is a lot of potential for growth.118 Thus, an
important research question to explore is the extent to which the
composition and structure of state public utility commissions in
the United States can be credited with advancing or slowing
the development of constituencies for effective decarbonization
policies. One study found that states with a larger public utility
commission also had lower production of renewable energy, but
having an appointed versus an elected public utility

117 Current research on this question is mixed. See Delmas & Montes-Sancho,
supra note 57, at 2278, 2281 (finding negative correlation between deregulation and
renewable energy production); Kelsey & Meckling, supra note 72, at 2, 5, 8.
118 See PW Ventures, 533 So. 2d at 282, 284 (state court upholding agency
position).
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commission did not have a strong relationship with renewable
energy production.119
3. The Role of Public Utility Ownership
A still common form of state involvement in the energy
sector is public ownership of electricity utilities. Are publicly
owned utilities more or less supportive of effective
decarbonization policies than privately owned utilities? There is
evidence that private, investor-owned utilities in the United
States are more responsive to renewable portfolio standards,120
but there is also evidence that public utilities might not oppose
efforts to increase renewable energy in a state.121 On the other
hand, one might also speculate that states in which substantial
amounts of pre-existing fossil fuel generation are part of publicly
owned utilities will generally have a harder time creating
motivation for renewable energy policy, since these fossil fuel
interests exist “inside” the state government rather than external
to it. In the case of publicly owned utilities, is the interest of the
utility more likely to become the de facto interest of the state?
D.

Importance of Renewable Energy Development

A fourth set of questions revolves around whether the
nature or kind of renewable energy development has implications
for political economy (e.g., through the differing impacts of
various developmental pathways on relevant interest groups).
Here, we focus on the differences between utility-scale generation
(large projects, typically developed by utilities or large
independent power producers) and distributed generation (small
projects, often for individual residences or commercial facilities).

119 Yi & Feiock, supra note 57, at 396–97, 408–09. Some U.S. public utility
commissions have remarkably high levels of independence that allow them to impose
significant policy tools—such as RPS requirements—without any legislative input at
all. See, e.g., Miller v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 251 P.3d 400, 406, 408–10 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2011) (upholding Arizona Corporation Commission’s creation of RPS requirement
based on state constitutional provision). An interesting research question is whether
commissions that can take such steps without legislative authorization are more or less
likely to advance decarbonization efforts.
120 Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 57, at 2278, 2281.
121 Leah C. Stokes, The Politics of Renewable Energy Policies: The Case of
Feed-in Tariffs in Ontario, Canada, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 490, 492–94 (2013) (noting
Ontario’s leadership in North America in enacting a feed-in tariff, and that most of the
electricity generation in the province is publicly owned and that public entity did not
take a position in the political debates over renewable energy policy, in contrast to
efforts by incumbent private electric utilities in other jurisdictions to undercut
renewable energy policy).
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Utility-scale generation creates the possibility that
utilities—a powerful interest-group player in energy law and
policy—might make significant investments in renewable energy
and therefore can be converted to become powerful allies for
future decarbonization (placing them, as suggested above, in the
category of “Substitutable/Convertible” industries). Interestingly,
our initial research indicates that much of the utility-scale
generation has been developed by independent power producers,
both in Europe and the United States.122 This does create new
interest groups to support decarbonization, but it might be less
effective at facilitating the conversion of existing interest groups.
This question is further complicated by the potential for
different relationships between independent power producers
(IPPs) and utilities. For instance, IPPs and utilities in Germany
have developed an adversarial, competitive relationship.123 In
California, by contrast, medium-sized and large IPPs and utilities
often end up in long-term contracts that yoke their interests
together, at least in the short- to medium-term. For instance, in
2014, 42.6% of PG&E’s total retail electricity sales came from
contracted power from qualifying facilities, irrigation districts and
water agencies, and other third-party purchase agreements.124
The percentage in contracted power when looking at renewables
only (including small hydroelectric but excluding large
hydroelectric) was 95.6%.125 Although contracts can vary in
length, PG&E’s discussion suggests that contracts for these
categories of power extend as far out as 2043.126 We suggest that
this is due to the fact that a renewable portfolio standard is
imposed on electric utilities, which maintain their role as
gatekeepers in electricity supply.127 A feed-in tariff, instead,
creates direct competition for incumbent utilities.
Distributed generation, on the other hand, creates the
possibility that thousands or millions of individuals or
companies put significant investments into renewable energy
and expect long-term benefits from renewable energy. In
particular, distributed generation on residences has primarily
Kelsey & Meckling, supra note 72, at 1.
See Gregor Kungl, Stewards or Sticklers for Change? Incumbent Energy
Providers and the Politics of the German Energy Transition, 8 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI.
13, 21 (2015).
124 See PG&E Corp. & Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 2014 JOINT ANNUAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS 13 (2015), http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc_financials/2015/2014Annual-Report-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3E2-E5LD].
125 Id.
126 Id. at 126.
127 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.15(b) (West 2016) (requiring all
“retail sellers” of electricity to meet RPS requirements).
122
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focused on middle- and upper-income homeowners. While there
are strong concerns about the regressive nature of renewable
energy subsidies for these homeowners, such as net-metering
programs,128 those subsidies also have the benefit of drawing in
as potential allies some of the most politically active members
of the voting public. In some U.S. states, such as Georgia and
Arizona, homeowners who have invested in distributed
generation—either through installing their own equipment or
signing a lease with an installer—have been strong advocates for
maintaining existing subsidy programs such as net metering and
resisting efforts by utility companies to shift more of the fixed
costs of transmission and distribution onto distributed generation
customers.129 This has created some interesting emerging political
coalitions; local Tea Party and Sierra Club chapters have come
together to fight proposed increases in distribution and
transmission charges for distributed generation customers.130
More generally, there is some evidence that more distributed
generation might reduce not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) efforts

128 In a net-metering program, distributed generators of solar energy (such as
homeowners with rooftop solar panels) are paid by the electric utility for the solar
energy they produce and are only charged for the cost of any electricity that they use
that exceeds (or is “net” of) the value of their production. Among the controversial
questions in net metering is the rate at which distributed generators should be
compensated. For example, if distributed generation is paid for at the retail cost of
electricity, distributed generators would be paid much more for their electricity
production, producing greater expenses for the utility. One reason that net-metering
programs may be regressive is that installation of distributed generation equipment
(such as rooftop solar) is generally expensive and/or requires the consumer to own their
own property. Lower-income electricity consumers will often be renters and/or will not
have the resources to invest in distributed generation equipment. As a result, the
effective subsidies for distributed generation provided through net metering may
disproportionately benefit higher-income utility consumers. Since the costs of net
metering for the utility must be borne by all of the utility’s consumers, the result may
be that lower-income utility consumers are subsidizing the distributed generation of
higher-income consumers. See Jacobs, supra note 114.
129 See Eric Biber, A Solar Energy Fight in Arizona, LEGAL PLANET (Dec. 9,
2013), http://legal-planet.org/2013/12/09/a-solar-energy-fight-in-arizona [https://perma.
cc/ZDU5-89H5] (describing the political battles in Arizona); Grace Wyler, A War over
Solar Power Is Raging Within the GOP, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 21, 2013), https://new
republic.com/article/115582/solar-power-fight-raging-gop [https://perma.cc/62WK-5J67]
(describing fights in Arizona and Georgia). We note that there are legitimate arguments
that distributed generation customers should pay more for these transmission and
distribution costs, at least to the extent they continue to rely on the grid for service at
night or when solar production is otherwise low. Otherwise, the fixed costs of maintaining
the grid might begin to fall disproportionately on the remaining, nondistributed
generation customers of the utility who will often be relatively poor.
130 See Christopher Martin, Tea Party, Sierra Club Unite to Support Solar
Energy in Georgia, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2013-11-27/tea-party-sierra-club-unite-to-support-solar-energy-in-georgia
[https://perma.cc/BL3Y-HMX4].
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to restrict renewable energy projects in general by making
voters more supportive of decarbonization overall.131
The dichotomy between utility-scale and distributed
generation projects is not necessarily a sharp one. There are
situations where the benefits from utility-scale projects might be
broadly distributed among landowners or other members of the
public, creating the kinds of political benefits associated with
distributed generation. For instance, the utility-scale wind farms
in West Texas have resulted in substantial lease payments to
farmers throughout the region, which in turn have increased
political support for aggressive policy efforts to advance wind
power in Texas, despite Texas’s conservative politics and large
oil and gas industry.132 This demonstrates that there are certain
circumstances where utility-scale generation can yield the same
long-term benefits as distributed generation. Since either
practice can be shown to yield economic gains, deciding which
one to employ becomes a question of political viability instead.
E.

Importance of Different Regulatory Tools

As our initial work indicated, a key question is how
different legal or policy tools (subsidies, regulations, taxes, capand-trade systems, etc.) might vary in the benefits they provide
in nurturing a favorable political economy for subsequent
climate policy.133 Our early research indicated that direct
interventions that fall into the general category of green
industrial policy may be initially more successful because they
provide benefits to key constituencies. Yet that is only a general
pattern observed across a wide diversity of states. Are there
variations depending on context? For instance, a carbon tax may

131 Sylvia Breukers & Maarten Wolsink, Wind Power Implementation in
Changing Institutional Landscapes: An International Comparison, 35 ENERGY POL’Y
2737, 2740, 2743 (2007).
132 See, e.g., Christian Brannstrom et al., Social Perspectives on Wind-Power
Development in West Texas, 101 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 839, 842 (2011); Lisa
Chavarria, Wind Power: Prospective Issues, 68 TEX. BAR J. 832, 833–34 (2005); Miriam
Fischlein et al., Policy Stakeholders and Deployment of Wind Power in the Sub-National
Context: A Comparison of Four U.S. States, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4429, 4436–37 (2010);
Michael C. Slattery et al., State and Local Economic Impacts from Wind Energy Projects:
Texas Case Study, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 7930, 7932–33, 7936 (2011); Jeffrey Swofford &
Michael Slattery, Public Attitudes of Wind Energy in Texas: Local Communities in Close
Proximity to Wind Farms and Their Effect on Decision-Making, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2508,
2511–15 (2010).
133 See Meckling et al., supra note 16, at 1170–71.
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be more plausible as a meaningful first step where the politics
are already fairly easy, as in British Columbia or Norway.134
We will also consider whether there are significant
variations within different kinds of green industrial policies in
terms of effectiveness in building a supportive political economy.
There has been a fair amount of discussion about the relative
merits of renewable portfolio standards versus feed-in tariffs.135
Currently, the standard view is that feed-in tariffs benefit
distributed generation more, while renewable portfolio standards
benefit industrial-scale generation more136—and as noted above,
we might conclude that in certain contexts, we would prefer to
support distributed generation over industrial scale generation
(or vice versa).137
However, we also have initial research indicating that
the difference between renewable portfolio standards and feed-in
tariffs in terms of which types of constituencies they support
may be overstated, and other factors are more important in
determining the relative growth of utility-scale or distributed
generation in a particular jurisdiction.138 Other relevant factors
in shaping distributional outcomes include the specific policy
design of support instruments, resource endowments, and
technology prices.
F.

Importance of Policy Diffusion Across Jurisdictions

A final series of questions revolves around the
possibility of diffusion of climate policies from one jurisdiction
to another. “[D]iffusion occurs when one government’s decision
about whether to adopt a policy innovation is influenced by the
choices made by other governments.”139 Diffusion is particularly
important in the context of decarbonization because climate
change is a global problem that cannot be solved by unilateral
action from a single jurisdiction. Accordingly, adoption of
134 See Harrison, supra note 84, at 28, 39–42 (describing how Norway and
British Columbia faced lower political barriers to enacting carbon taxes because most
of the economic impacts were felt outside their borders).
135 See, e.g., Jenner et al., supra note 68, at 3–4, 10.
136 Id. (stating this general hypothesis and finding that utilities fight feed-intariff programs more strongly than RPS).
137 See supra Section II.D.
138 Kelsey & Meckling, supra note 72, at 1–3.
139 Erin R. Graham et al., Review Article: The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion
Research in Political Science, 43 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 673, 675 (2012); see also Zachary
Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework,
598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 37–38 (2005) (quoting definition of diffusion
as “the process by which the ‘prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the
probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters’”).
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climate policies by individual nations or subnational
jurisdictions will be far more effective if those jurisdictions
encourage adoption of similar policies by others than if they
remain isolated.
A frequently identified factor influencing the diffusion of
policies across jurisdictions is geography.140 There is evidence,
however, that geographic proximity may not be so important in
the context of renewable energy policy.141 It is possible that what
is more important, particularly for energy resources where
transportation infrastructure is costly and important (e.g.,
electricity, natural gas), is the patterns by which that
transportation infrastructure connects across jurisdictions. For
instance, jurisdictions that are closely interconnected in the
electric grid might be much more susceptible to policy diffusion.
This appears to be one explanation for why the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)142 cap-and-trade program in
the Northeastern United States was able to avoid giving away its
permits for free, and instead was able to auction them (something
that is presumed to be politically challenging).143 There is also
evidence that California’s efforts to encourage the development of
renewable energy has had an impact on other states in the
Western United States that are closely tied to California through
the electric grid.144 On the other hand, states that have relatively
isolated energy infrastructures—for instance, Texas, which has
its own independent electric grid that is not connected to other
states—may be both less susceptible to policy diffusion and may
have less impact on other jurisdictions.145
The policy diffusion literature indicates other ways that
climate policy innovations might spread across jurisdictions.
140 See, e.g., Bruce A. Desmarais et al., Persistent Policy Pathways: Inferring
Diffusion Networks in the American States, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 392, 393 (2015)
(noting importance of geography in policy diffusion literature).
141 Matisoff, supra note 62, at 542–43.
142 RGGI is a multi-state program among nine northeastern U.S. states that
imposes mandatory reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector and
uses a cap-and-trade program to achieve those reductions. See Welcome, REG’L
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org [https://perma.cc/QJ2S-BR97].
143 See Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and
Emissions Auctions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 62–65 (2013).
144 Biber, supra note 10, at 439–40.
145 The interaction of jurisdictions through electric grids can be understood as
a form of competition or coercion to the extent that climate policies implemented by one
jurisdiction on an interconnected grid change the costs and benefits of climate and
energy policies for other jurisdictions in the grid. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig
Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840, 842 (2008) (noting
importance of economic spillovers in shaping policy adoption by jurisdictions, and
characterizing this as competition); see also Elkins & Simmons, supra note 139, at 39
(noting how “the policy decisions of one government [can] alter the conditions under
which other governments base their decisions”).
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The enactment of climate policies by one or more jurisdictions
might help to change norms at a national or international level
or to change understandings of what kinds of policies are both
possible and desirable.146 The success or failure of one
jurisdiction’s policy choices will likely affect the adoption of those
policies by another jurisdiction through a process of learning.147
Here, cultural, political, and economic similarities across
countries will likely facilitate learning148 as well as connections
through important elite or professional knowledge networks.149
Finally, large or wealthy jurisdictions will generally be more
influential with respect to choices by other countries, and
interestingly, may be more likely to learn from other countries as
well.150 We believe these diffusion mechanisms are also important
angles for additional study—we specifically discuss the role of
norms in Section III.B.
III.

FURTHER EXTENSIONS

We have already outlined an ambitious research
agenda. However, we believe there are at least two additional
questions that are intimately tied to our research agenda
whose answers are ultimately crucial for our research to be
useful to policymakers.
A.

Dead-Ends and Lock-Ins

First is the question of whether the use of climate policy
to grow and nurture interest groups friendly to decarbonization
might eventually backfire if they facilitate the growth of interest
groups that ultimately advance counterproductive policies. At
the most basic level, society might enact policies that it believes
146 See Frank Dobbin et al., The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social
Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 449, 450–54 (2007);
Elkins & Simmons, supra note 139, at 39–40 (noting how actions by one set of jurisdictions
can change cultural norms and thereby influence choices by other jurisdictions); Graham et
al., supra note 139, at 692–93 (noting the importance of “socialization” in how one
jurisdiction’s choices can alter choices by another jurisdictions); Per-Olof Busch & Helge
Jörgens, The International Sources of Policy Convergence: Explaining the Spread of
Environmental Policy Innovations, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2005).
147 See
Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of
Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 171, 175 (2004).
148 Id. at 175–76; see Desmarais et al., supra note 140, at 400; Elkins &
Simmons, supra note 139, at 44–45.
149 Simmons & Elkins, supra note 147, at 175; Dobbin et al., supra note 146,
at 460–62; Graham et al., supra note 139, at 687.
150 Graham et al., supra note 139, at 686; Shipan & Volden, supra note 145, at
851 (finding that larger, wealthier local governments were more likely to initiate and to
learn from anti-smoking policy innovations).
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are useful or productive in terms of advancing a decarbonization
agenda only to find that in practice those policies are actively
harmful. However, by nurturing the growth of interest groups
that support those counterproductive policies, those groups have
become entrenched, making progress to decarbonization more
difficult. The result could be a policy dead-end that society cannot
extricate itself from, with suboptimal or counterproductive carbon
policies entrenched and irreversible.151
An example of this kind of mistake is the support of cornbased ethanol biofuels in the United States. While these fuels
were initially thought to be helpful in advancing decarbonization
by reducing the greenhouse gas emissions from transportation,
it turned out that they might be worse than gasoline in terms of
greenhouse gas emissions.152
Political subsidies for corn-based ethanol proved difficult
to subsequently remove, however, because they had built up
powerful interest groups that supported them.153 It did not help
that one of the states most benefitted by the policy (Iowa) is
central to the American presidential selection process, and that
agribusiness in general has disproportionate power in the
American political system.154 Such a form of technological lock-in
is similar to the lock-in of fossil fuel interests that the politics of
decarbonization is trying to overcome.155
A second kind of lock-in problem might be that over
time the kinds of environmental and energy challenges society
faces might evolve such that we need to adopt new policies or
address new problems. It might be that the interest groups
that we have supported to solve the problems of the past may
be threatened by or obstructionist toward the solutions for the
problems of the future. Again, if we have nurtured the growth
of these interest groups, we have made solving a problem in the
future more difficult.
A third kind of lock-in problem might be that society
may, eventually, get too much of a good thing. A climate policy
that has been eminently successful up to this point may no
151 See Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D’Ambrosio, Policymaking Under Pressure:
The Perils of Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1423–
25 (2008) (noting this risk and calling it the “lock-in” problem).
152 In particular, considering the fossil fuels required for much industrial corn
agriculture and for the production of the corn-based ethanol, corn-based ethanol might
result in more greenhouse gas emissions than petroleum. Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol:
Law, Economics, and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 434, 446–49 (2008); Donald T.
Hornstein, The Environmental Role of Agriculture in an Era of Carbon Caps, 20
HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 145, 154–57 (2010).
153 See Biber, supra note 10, at 445.
154 Hahn, supra note 152, at 434–35.
155 See generally Unruh, supra note 8, at 817–30.
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longer be as effective, possibly because the cost of the policy has
gotten too high, or the problem it sought to address has mostly
been resolved. Society may then need to move onto new policies,
but the interest groups that we have nurtured may resist this
change yet again because they continue to benefit privately from
the policies that no longer serve the public interest.
A possible example of this kind of lock-in might be
renewable energy industries resisting a shift from subsidies such
as feed-in tariffs toward more efficient support systems. It is
plausible, for instance, that in Germany the costs of the feed-in
tariff have simply gotten too large as renewable energy has grown
so much.156 If this were the case, then the government’s shift to
more efficient support systems, such as auctioning, might be the
appropriate response. But the renewable energy industries that
have benefitted so much from the feed-in tariff might be sharply
resistant towards winding down those subsidies.
We believe lock-in is a fundamental problem for the
political economy of decarbonization; if society makes the wrong
choices, efforts to decarbonize global economies may be seriously
damaged. We also see it as an inevitable problem. No matter
what climate policy choices society makes, (and whether or not
they are made with a conscious understanding of their political
economy consequences), those choices will advance some groups
and harm others. To some extent, given uncertainty about what
policies will best work now, and what problems society will face in
the future, there is an inherent risk that the policy choices that
are selected now might make progress in the future more difficult.
In the end, society may not be able to solve the problem
of lock-in. But given the seriousness of the climate issue, and the
limitations on the tools that are currently politically available to
combat it, we do believe it is important to conduct research as to
whether there are policy tools that are more or less vulnerable to
lock-in problems.
B.

Social Norms

A second important extension of our work is
understanding how social norms will interact with climate law
and policy to advance decarbonization. Law is only one of many
factors that shape human behavior. Norms in society about what
kind of behavior is acceptable or unacceptable can often be an
156 For a recent discussion of those costs, which fall disproportionately on
residential electricity customers in Germany, see Mormann et al., supra note 79, at 81–
82, 92–96.
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even more important determinant. Thus, another important
extension to our work is the extent to which changes in social
norms about the use of fossil fuels may shape what is politically
possible, and reciprocally the extent to which changes in law and
policy may shape those norms.157
There is substantial evidence that law does shape social
norms, including in the environmental context.158 Over time,
that can be extremely important in ensuring the success of
climate policy and decarbonization. For one thing, actions by
individuals are a major component of greenhouse gas emissions
on a global scale159—social norms may at times be more effective
in changing individual behavior than law.160 For another,
changes in norms may, in turn, change what is politically
conceivable. If the use of coal as a fossil fuel becomes socially
unacceptable, then it becomes much easier to strictly regulate or
even prohibit its use. It also makes backsliding on climate policy
much more difficult, since repeal of strict regulations on coal use
will become less politically feasible.
There are also many ways in which social norms are
shaped besides law. Current social movements mobilizing around
climate change can be understood as, in part, having a goal of
changing social norms around the acceptability of the use of fossil
fuels. In addition, if the interest groups that support and depend
upon fossil fuel use become less economically and politically
powerful, that in turn may affect the development of social norms
as well. The less economically dependent individuals or a society

157 Levin et al., supra note 22, at 146 (encouraging researchers in climate
policy to consider norms).
158 See Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory
and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133,
223–28 (2014).
159 See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1402, 1406–11 (2011) (describing how a large
proportion of greenhouse gas emissions are the accumulation of many small emissions
sources); see also Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117,
120–21 (2009) (“Individuals directly generate approximately one-third of U.S. greenhouse
gas emissions, and one-third of the energy consumed in this country is used by
households.”); Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change
and Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,825, 10,828 (2008) (“Facility-specific regulation, the
dominant pollution control measure in much of the developed world, is difficult in part
because the facilities that manufacture goods account for only roughly one-quarter of the
total carbon emissions from production. The remaining emissions arise from the supply
chain, vast portions of which may be located abroad. In addition, the carbon emissions that
arise from the use of goods often swamp the emissions from their production.” (footnotes
omitted)). The IPCC has noted the importance of individual activities for mitigation of
climate change. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 20.
160 See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 158, at 223–28.
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is on a particular activity, the easier it can be to develop norms
against that activity.
We flag these questions around social norms because we
believe they are important to a fuller understanding of the
political economy of decarbonization, and we believe that any
research agenda on these questions must consider social norms.
We hope to more fully develop hypotheses that we can explore
and test on these questions.
CONCLUSION
The questions we have developed in this research agenda
will not be easy to answer. We fully appreciate the difficulties of
untangling cause and effect, of clearly describing categories, and
of understanding the full range of complexities of social
interactions mediated through institutions on a global scale.161
Taken together, the key questions we have identified in this
research agenda yield an ambitious blueprint for trying to
understand the political economy of decarbonization. Although
implementing this blueprint will be a large undertaking, we
think the challenges are worth tackling given the stakes—
providing insight to policymakers in addressing climate change
and identifying the most important factors they should consider
in enacting politically practical carbon policies. Our prior
research found that “carrots buy sticks”; the results from our
research agenda will help identify the most politically feasible
sticks that the carrots can buy.

161 See generally Mark Purdon, Advancing Comparative Climate Change
Politics: Theory and Method, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 7–10 (2015) (discussing the
methodological challenges of understanding comparative environmental politics, noting
that scholars “should be vigilante to avoid treating the political universe as a complex set
of billiard balls,” and noting possible tools such as careful use of small-N and medium-N
methods to address these questions). We appreciate, for instance, that comparative work
needs to understand local complexities of the units being compared and the pitfalls of
blithely making comparisons across cultures and political systems. For a cautionary tale
of those pitfalls in the context of comparative environmental politics, see Tim Forsyth &
Les Levidow, An Ontological Politics of Comparative Environmental Analysis: The Green
Economy and Local Diversity, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 140 (2015).

